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1.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the properties of the Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and Pissarides (2000) style labor market matching model, ex-
tended with a labor market participation choice embedded in a stochas-
tic growth model. The bulk of modern business cycle theories assume
instantaneous and costless matching of employers and workers (Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum 1992; Hansen 1985; and Prescott 1986). Labor
market matching models, as an alternative, realistically assume it takes
time and resources to match firms wishing to fill job vacancies with
workers looking for jobs. This labor market matching process intro-
duces frictional unemployment and it places the labor market in a cen-
tral role in the transmission of shocks over time and across agents.
Therefore, it is not surprising that this framework, which has proven ex-
tremely successful as a tool for understanding the long-run determi-
nants of unemployment (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2005), is receiving
growing interest in the business cycle literature (Andolfatto 1996;
Cheron and Langot 2004, den Haan, Ramey, and Watson 2000; Gertler
and Trigari 2005; Hall 2005; Merz 1995; and Shimer 2005).
In the Mortensen-Pissarides setup, the labor market matching process
is modeled on the basis of a matching function that relates the number
of new job matches to the number of search-active unmatched agents
and to the number of job vacancies posted by firms. When deciding on
the number of job vacancies to post, firms consider the cost of setting
aside resources to open a job vacancy relative to the expected benefits
that a successful job match produces. Thus, on the part of firms, match-
ing models allow for variations in the extensive search margin.
On the part of workers, most applications of matching and search the-10 Ravn
ories in the business cycle literature assume the labor market participa-
tion rate is constant. Therefore, variations in the extensive search mar-
gin occur only through changes in the net hiring rate (the difference be-
tween the number of new job matches and the termination of existing
job-worker relationships). This assumption might seem natural, given
that the labor market participation rate does not vary much over the
business cycle. We argue that this latter argument is misleading on sev-
eral grounds. First, consistent with the theory that we propose, U.S. la-
bor market participation rates display procyclical movements. Second,
it is important to understand whether the relatively low volatility of the
participation rate is consistent with economic theory. Third, in order to
ask whether theory can account for the empirically observed moments
of unemployment, the measurements of unemployment (in the data and
in theory) need to be consistent, and this requires the introduction of a
participation choice. Finally—and this is a main contribution of this pa-
per—we show that the matching model extended with a participation
choice provides a series of strong predictions for indicators that are cen-
tral in labor market matching models, and for variables that are at the
heart of business cycle research.
We assume that in order to participate in labor market activities,
agents need to give up leisure that enables them to search for a job. In re-
turn, consistent with Flinn and Heckman (1983), search active agents
face a (potentially) more favorable labor market outcome than nonpar-
ticipants. In particular, we assume the matching probability of the for-
mer group of agents is higher than the matching probability of the latter.
Therefore, the participation choice is based on the trade-off between giv-
ing up leisure to be search active, versus the expected benefits of being
search active.
We are not the first to introduce participation choice into models of la-
bor market search and labor market matching. Burdett et al. (1984) ana-
lyze and estimate a three-state labor market search model with partici-
pation choice (Bowlus 1997). Andolfatto and Gomme (1996) study a
search model with participation choice, in order to analyze the effects of
labor market policies. Following Pissarides (2000), a number of papers
have analyzed matching models with participation choice. Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2005), Haefke and Reiter (2006), Pries and Rogerson
(2004), and Yip (2003) all analyze dynamic search models with partici-
pation choice, in which shocks to the value of nonparticipation (relative
to participation) generates flows in and out of the labor market. Each of
these papers examine models without savings and assume incompleteThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 11
markets. The current paper (instead) introduces production and sav-
ings. As discussed by Hall (2006), savings and self-insurance are key
when accounting for the search incentives of the unemployed. We as-
sume complete markets, since this gives rise to a much simpler frame-
work than more complicated incomplete markets settings. Furthermore,
it appears that the complete markets setting closely emulates the main
properties of the perhaps more realistic incomplete markets self-
insurance model (Hall 2006). Moreover, our analysis allows for risk
aversion, and we show that this is a key parameter. Similar complete
markets settings have been analyzed by Veracierto (2003) and by Ravn
(2005). Veracierto (2003) introduces a labor market participation choice
into a Lucas-Alvarez type (island) search model, with production and
savings assuming complete markets. Ravn (2005) estimates a more com-
plicated version of the model, which is analyzed in the current paper.
The main innovation of the current paper, relative to Veracierto (2003)
and Ravn (2005), is that we are able to derive a simple and robust rela-
tionship between labor market tightness and consumption, which ap-
pears to have been overlooked in previous research.
The model we study introduces a symmetry between firms' and
workers' search activities, since both sides of the labor market vary their
search efforts at the extensive margin. This symmetry is shown to have
important consequences, and (surprisingly) is of considerable analytical
convenience. When allowing for variations in the labor market partici-
pation rate, the first-order condition for households' search intensity
along the extensive margin resembles the more familiar vacancy post-
ing condition that derives from the firms' problem. In particular, varia-
tions in households' search intensity along the extensive margin equal-
ize the marginal costs of the search (the utility value of a loss of leisure)
with the expected marginal benefit of labor market search, which is the
product of the probability that the labor market search produces a match
and the marginal benefit of being employed.
When this insight is combined with the assumption that wages are de-
termined according to a (postmatch) Nash bargain, it implies a linear re-
lationship between labor market tightness and the marginal utility of
consumption. We refer to this result as the consumption-tightness puzzle.
This allows us to fully characterize the cyclical variations in labor mar-
ket tightness on the basis of the cyclical variations in consumption.
Therefore, a great advantage of our analysis is that we derive a simple,
testable relationship that does not depend upon the source of shocks to
the economy, nor on the persistence of these shocks.12 Ravn
We frame this relationship as a puzzle for the following reasons. First,
it implies a very low volatility of the z?u-ratio (or extreme volatility of
consumption), since the standard deviation of the logarithm of the vu-
ratio should equal the standard deviation of the logarithm of consump-
tion times the curvature of the marginal utility of consumption. The lat-
ter is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (or the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution [IES]), and standard estimates of
this parameter are small, and values above five are usually claimed to be
implausible. In contrast, in U.S. quarterly data, the standard deviation
of the uu-ratio is around twenty times higher than the standard devia-
tion of consumption in the business cycle frequencies. Thus, theory can
account for a maximum of 25 percent of the observed volatility of the vu-
ratio. Expressed differently, the model implies procyclical unemploy-
ment, since vacancies are not only slightly more procyclical than realis-
tic measures of the marginal utility of consumption, but also display
much higher volatility. Alternatively, this latter insight can be formu-
lated in terms of the slope of the Beveridge curve, which is positive in the
model but negative in the data.
The rationale for why the matching model, with an extensive search
margin, implies a positive correlation between unemployment and va-
cancies is straightforward. Consider a situation in which firms decide to
post more vacancies. This increases households' payoff from labor mar-
ket participation since, for a given unemployment rate, the probability
increases that a job search will result in a job match. Therefore, there will
be a positive correlation between vacancies and labor market participa-
tion. Moreover, since higher unemployment increases the returns from
posting job vacancies, firms react by increasing job vacancies. This
mechanism introduces a positive correlation between unemployment
and vacancies, unless the variations in labor market tightness are related
to large (inversely signed) variations in the marginal utility of con-
sumption, and we argue that the latter is empirically implausible. This
positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies also ex-
plains why the volatility of labor market tightness is low.
We show that these insights are robust, and study four extensions of
the model. First, we introduce an intensive search margin. We assume
that agents can vary their search effort, but that a higher search effort is
costly. We show that this extension leaves the consumption-tightness
puzzle unaltered for plausible parametrizations of the search effort
costs. Next, we introduce home production. In this setup, the participa-
tion choice is a trade-off between forgoing the benefits of labor marketThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 13
search, and giving up the resources generated by home production. This
implies a modification to the relationship between consumption (of
market goods) and tightness, but we argue it might possibly worsen the
consumption-tightness puzzle. The reason is that the implied relation-
ship no longer depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption.
The final two extensions alter the assumptions of the matching frame-
work. We first allow for passive search, that is, for the possibility that non-
participants might be matched with a job vacancy despite not actively
searching for a job. This setup is (potentially) consistent with the fact that
there are substantial flows from out of the labor force into employment.
This extension does address the consumption-tightness puzzle, because
there is less incentive to become search active when nonparticipation also
allows agents to find jobs. Nevertheless, for realistic assumptions regard-
ing the size of flows into employment from unemployment and non-
participation, the consumption-tightness puzzle is approximately un-
changed. In the second setting, we assume the matching technology is
duration dependent. In particular, we assume unemployed workers
might be faced with either an efficient or an inefficient matching technol-
ogy, where the latter is associated with a smaller matching probability
than the former. This setup gives rise to a relationship between consump-
tion and an altered version of tightness, defined as the ratio of vacancies
to the measure of search-active workers faced with the inefficient match-
ing function (who are, on average, long-term unemployed). In this case,
we leave it open whether duration dependence is important for the con-
sumption-tightness puzzle, because it is hard to match the implied mea-
sure of unemployment with official unemployment statistics.
A key aspect of the labor market matching model with an extensive
search margin is that the participation rate should be procyclical (posi-
tively correlated with consumption). Such procyclical movements in the
participation rate can actually be observed in U.S. data. In particular, the
secular rise in the participation rate that has occurred in the United
States over the last sixty years slowed down in each of the recessions
dated by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. Furthermore, we
show that a positive correlation exists between consumption and the
participation rate at the business cycle frequencies. However, participa-
tion rates lag around a year after consumption, and the elasticity of the
participation rate to consumption is very low. We argue that future re-
search needs to look into the reasons why labor market participation,
although procyclical, varies little over the business cycle.14 Ravn
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2
presents the basic model and derives the main result on the relationship
between consumption and labor market tightness. Section 1.3 extends
the basic setup to include, in turn, an intensive search margin, home-
work, passive search, and duration-dependent matching functions. Sec-
tion 1.4 discusses the implications for variations in participation rates,
and section 1.5 concludes and summarizes.
1.2 The Model
We study a stochastic optimal growth model combined with a labor
market matching modeling of the labor market similar to that of Andol-
fatto (1996) and Merz (1995). We introduce a participation choice mod-
eled as a trade-off between forgoing the opportunity of finding a job and
the cost of giving up leisure in order to engage in labor market search
activities. We show that introducing the extensive search margin (the
participation choice) has fundamental implications.
1.2.1 Preferences and Technology
There is a measure one of a household. A household consists of a con-
tinuum of agents, and it is assumed that households pool the idiosyn-
cratic labor market risk of their members. At any point in time a measure
(nt) of the household members are employed and earn labor income, a
measure (ut) are nonemployed but actively searching, and a measure
(1 — nt — ut) are out of the labor force. Unemployment is measured by
the second group of agents. Thus, consistent with the measurement of
U.S. unemployment, we define unemployed agents as characterized by
(1) not matched with an employer, but (2) actively searching for a job.
Employed household members supply lt hours of work, and, as in the
labor-hoarding model of Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), there is a
fixed leisure cost of s > 0 of engaging in labor market activities. Non em-
ployed actively searching household members also face the fixed cost (s)
of participating in labor market activities. Nonparticipants, instead, en-
joy all their time endowment as leisure.
The period utility function of a household member is given as:
M(c,,e,) = G(c,) + H(£>,), (1)
where cit denotes consumption, and eit denotes leisure (given labor mar-
ket status i = n,u,l). We denote by i = n that the household member isThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 15
employed, by i = u that the household member is unemployed, and by
i — I that the household member is not participating. The time endow-
ment is normalized to one unit. It follows that ent = 1 — lt — s, eut = 1 — s,
ande/f = 1.
The flow utility of a representative household is then given as:
u(ct, et) = G(ct) + ntH(l -lt-s) + utH(l -s) + (l-nt- ut)H(l).
Here we have used the risk-sharing principle that—due to separabil-
ity of preferences—implies each household member consumes the same
amount of goods regardless of his or her labor market status.
The subutility functions G and H are assumed to be increasing and
strictly concave. We restrict G(ct) to be of the form G(ct) = c)~^/{l - r\)
for T] > 0 and r\ ^ 1, or G(ct) = In cr The parameter 1/T| is the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (IES). Utility is assumed to be additively
separable over time:
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information
available at date t, and (3 < 1 is the subjective discount factor.
Firms with vacancies and unemployed workers meet randomly in an
anonymous matching market. Matches are formed according to the fol-
lowing matching function:
mt = M(vt, ut), (2)
where mt is the measure of new matches between a measure of ut unem-
ployed workers and vt vacant jobs in period t. The function M is as-
sumed to be increasing and concave in each of its arguments, and to be
homogeneous of degree one in vacancies and unemployment jointly.
Given the constant returns assumption, we can express the matching
function as:
mt = Mf<p(et),
where 6t = vt/ut is the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and cp(0t) =
M(0(, 1). Thus, the probability that an actively searching worker finds a job
vacancy, y
ht = mt/ut = cp(0t), is an increasing function of Qt, while the prob-
ability that a job vacancy is matched with an unemployed worker, yf = mj
vt = cp(Gf)/0f, is a decreasing function of 0r It follows that y
hjy[ = 0f. Hence,
it is clear that the t?u-ratio (labor market tightness), is a key variable, since
it determines the matching market prospects of firms and workers.16 Ravn
This matching technology assumes that nonparticipants do not re-
ceive any job offers.
1 We later examine the consequences of allowing for
passive search as well, that is, assuming job offers might arrive for non-
participants as well.
Each period, firms and employed households face an exogenously
given probability that their match is terminated. This probability is
given by ut e (0, 1). Thus, the transition equation for employment
is given as:
nt+1 = (1 - at)nt + ut<p(8t). (3)
We assume that the job-separation rate follows an autoregressive pro-
cess:
In af+1 = (1 - pjln a + pa In ut + ef+1, (4)
where pCT e (-1,1), a > 0 denotes the unconditional mean of at, ef+1 is as- sumed to be normally and independently distributed over time with
mean 0 and variance va.
Output is produced using inputs of labor (the product of employment
and hours worked per employee), ntlt, capital, kt, and is subject to sto-
chastic productivity shocks, zt. We assume that firms take capital rental
rates, (rt) and the price of output (the numeraire) for given. As in Andol-
fatto (1996), we assume firms have a number of different jobs that may ei-
ther be filled, posted in the vacancy market, or dormant. If firms decide
to post a vacancy they must pay a resource cost (K > 0) per vacancy per
period. In equilibrium, firms determine the optimal number of vacancies
by maximizing their profits and taking into account the costs and bene-
fits of vacancy postings. The firms are owned by the households, and
their profits are paid out to the households as dividends.
The production function is specified by:
yt=f(kt,ntlt,zt), (5)
which we assume satisfies the Inada conditions, is increasing and
strictly concave in kt and in ntlt, and homogeneous of degree 1 in (kt, ntlt). The process for productivity shocks is assumed to be stationary, but pos-
sibly persistent:
In zt+1 = (1 - pz)ln z + p2 In zt + e
zt+v (6)
where p2 e (-1,1), z > 0 denotes the unconditional mean of z, and e
zt+1 is
assumed to be normally and independently distributed over time with
mean 0 and variance v^.The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 17
The capital stock evolves over time according to the standard neo-
classical specification:
kt+l = (1 - h)kt + it, (7)
where 8 e (0,1) denotes the depreciation rate, and it is gross investment.
The resource constraint of the economy is then given by:
yt>ct + it+KVr (8)
We assume wages are determined according to a standard Nash bar-
gaining over the joint match surplus of a worker-job pair. We let ft de-
note the bargaining weight of the workers. We do not impose the Hosios
(1990) condition, since our results will hold regardless of this efficiency
consideration.
We will now derive the implications of this model on the basis of
the competitive search equilibrium. Given the recursive structure of the
model, we remove time indices and use the notation x' to denote the
next-period value of the variable x.
1.2.2 The Households' Problem
The maximization problem of the representative household can be for-
mulated on the basis of the following Bellman equation:
]{k, n) = max {c
1^/(1 - T\) + nH(l - / - s) + uH(l - s)
(c,k',u,n')
n')}, (9)
c + k' < (1 - 8 + r)k + wnl + n (10)
n' = (1 - <j)n + i'u. (11)
The representative households' value function is denoted by J(k,n),
which depends on its holdings of capital, and the share of the household
members that are employed.
2 We use the notation Ex' to denote the ex-
pectation of x' conditional on all available current information (includ-
ing the transition laws for the exogenous shocks and the aggregate state
variables). Equation (10) is the budget constraint, which states that total
spending on consumption (c) and capital for the next period (k
1) cannot
exceed the sum of the value of its remaining capital stock (k — §k), rental
income from capital (rk), labor income (wnl), and the dividends received
from its ownership of the firms (TT).
Equation (11) is the households' employment transition function. It18 Ravn
relates the share of household members who are employed next period
(n
1), to this period's employment (n) corrected for net new employment.
The latter is given by the number of new worker job matches (^u) mi-
nus the separations of currently employed household members from
their jobs (crn). Importantly, individual households take the matching
probability (y
h) for given.
The first-order conditions for c,k',u, and n', in that order, are given by:




and the envelope conditions are:
(16)
UK n) = \wl + (1 - tr)kn + H(l - / - s) - H(l). (17)
Combining the first-order conditions for u and n' implies that:
Jfc', n') = H(l) - H(l - s). (18)
Equation (18) is key. The right-hand side of this expression is the util-
ity loss associated with a marginal change in the share of household
members that are search active, rather than nonparticipating. This util-
ity loss comes from the active search agents need to spend time on
search activities that nonparticipants instead enjoy as leisure. The left-
hand side of the expression is the expectation of the change in the value
of employment produced by a marginal change in the number of search-
active household members. This is given by the probability that an ac-
tive search agent is matched with a vacancy (y
h), times the expected
marginal value of employment next period (EJn,), discounted at the rate
of p.
Combining condition (18) with condition (17) gives us:
- s)
- s)The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 19
This is similar to the more familiar vacancy creation condition (which
we derive in the following). It sets the cost of labor market search equal
to the expected benefits. The latter consists of the sum of the (utility
value of the) marginal increase in labor income, and the future search
costs savings minus the utility value of the loss of leisure (associated
with working rather than enjoying the entire time as leisure).
1.2.3 The Firms' Problem
Bellman's equation for the firms' problem is given as:
Q(n) = max
k,v,n'
ri - (1 -
F(k, nl) - wnl - KV - rk + (3E—-Q(n') (20)
(21)
where Q{n) is the value of a firm with n-filled jobs. The objective func-
tion consists of the current profit flow (IT = F(k, nl) - wnl - KV - rk), plus
the discounted expected future value. The maximization takes place
subject to the job transition function, which links the future number of
filled jobs to the current stock of filled jobs plus net hiring where the lat-
ter is the difference between new hires (~i
fv), and exogenous termina-
tions of current jobs (cm).
The first-order conditions for this problem can be formulated as:
F, = r (22)
and from the envelope condition it follows that:
Qn(n) = Fn-wl
Combining this with equation (23) gives us:




Condition (22) equalizes the rental rate of capital with the marginal
product of capital. Equation (23) is the condition for the optimal number
of vacancy postings. The latter sets the vacancy posting cost (K) equal to20 Ravn
the expected discounted value of posting a vacancy, which is given by the
probability that a vacancy results in a new hire (-/) times the marginal
value of filling a vacancy [Q^(w')] discounted by $u'Juc. The value of fill-
ing a vacancy, in turn, is the sum of the marginal profit (the difference be-
tween the marginal product of a hire and the marginal wage cost) plus the
expected future vacancy posting cost savings. Combining these expres-
sions gives us the condition for vacancy postings given in equation (25).
1.2.4 Wages
Wages are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining. This
implies that employers and workers share the joint match surplus ac-
cording to their bargaining power. Let ft G (0,1) denote the firms' bar-
gaining power and let Sn denote the joint match surplus. The match sur-
plus is given as:
and the surplus is divided so that:
), (26)
where Qn and Jn were derived above. Evaluating condition (26) for the
next period, and taking expectations given today's information set, we
have:
This condition is simplified by using the first-order conditions from
the households' and the firms' problems. In particular, we have:
H(l) H( - s)
, = ft '
Therefore the Nash bargaining outcome implies:
- s) K () H( s)
(1 - ft)- = ft-^ ^
 }-c\ (27)
r T
which is the key relationship that we discuss below.The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 21
Using these, we can derive the equilibrium wage bill per employee as:
- / - s)],
which determines the wage as a weighted average of the marginal prod-
uct of employment, and the utility-weighted leisure cost of working
rather than enjoying the time as leisure.
1.2.5 The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle
We can now derive the key result, which is summarized by the follow-
ing proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. In the competitive search equilibrium, independent of the
source of shocks to the economy, the vu-ratio is related to consumption through-




where w z's a constant given by [H(l) - H(l - S)]/K.
PROOF. The result follows simply from rearranging condition (27) using
This equation summarizes (in a simple way) the central implications
for variations in unemployment and vacancies in the labor market
matching model, with an endogenous participation choice. As we will
show, the relationship implies: (a) low volatility of the vu-vaiio, (b) a
strong tendency for procyclical movements in unemployment, and (c) a
positively sloped Beveridge curve. Before we show these results, it is
worth mentioning that the relationship between labor market tightness
and consumption, derived above, does not depend on stochastic pro-
cesses for job-separation shocks and technology shocks, and it also does
not depend on the absence of capital adjustment costs (or on the pro-
duction technology).
Table 1.1 reports some selected moments of U.S. aggregate output and
labor market variables at the business cycle frequencies. We present
moments of quarterly data for the sample period 1964-2004. In order to
isolate movements in relevant variables at the business-cycle frequen-
cies, data were detrended with either the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) fil-
ter or the Baxter and King (1999) approximate band-pass filter.
3 We ex-22 Ravn
Table 1.1












































































amine the properties of aggregate output, aggregate consumption, ag-
gregate hours worked, aggregate unemployment, and vacancies, all as
ratios of the U.S. civilian noninstitutional population. The table also re-
ports the moments of the uu-ratio. Consumption is measured as U.S.
private sector consumption of non durables and services. Hours worked
are aggregate hours worked in the non farm part of the economy. Un-
employment is the total number of unemployed persons as reported by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Vacancies are measured on the basis of an
index of help wanted advertisements.
4 The table reports the percent-
age standard deviations of these variables, and some selected cross-
correlations.
In the United States, unemployment is strongly countercyclical and
very volatile. At the business-cycle frequencies, the standard deviationThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 23
of unemployment is close to 11 percent per quarter, or more than seven
times higher than that of output (nine times that of consumption). The
contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and output is
close to -0.90. Vacancies are even more volatile than unemployment
(its standard deviation is above 13 percent per quarter), and display
very procyclical behavior at the business cycle frequencies (the corre-
lation between vacancies and output is above 90 percent). The strong
negative contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and
vacancies, which forms part of the classic Beveridge curve relation-
ship, then implies high volatility of the uu-ratio (its standard deviation
is sixteen times that of output, or around twenty times that of con-
sumption) and a contemporaneous positive correlation with output in
excess of 0.90.
Consistent with condition (28), the i?w-ratio and consumption are pos-
itively correlated (the cross-correlation is approximately 80 percent in
the U.S. data). Figure 1.1 illustrates consumption, plotted against the vu-
ratio for the two detrending methods. The figure clearly visualizes the
positive correlation between them. The R
2 measure of fit is (as high as)
60 percent and 62 percent for Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered data and
Baxter-King (BK) filtered data, respectively.
However, for realistic degrees of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, theory can account for only a small fraction of the observed
volatility of the yw-ratio. Notice that condition (28) implies that regress-
ing the (logarithm of the) uw-ratio on (the logarithm of) consumption
should give an estimate of the inverse of the IES, or alternatively, that the
standard deviation of the uu-ratio implied by the model is equal to the
inverse of the IES, times the standard deviation of consumption. The
slopes of the regression lines in figure 1.1 imply estimates of the inverse
of the IES equal to 14.8 and 15.3, respectively, for the two panels of fig-
ure 1.1. The ratio of the standard deviations instead implies values of T|
of 19.2 and 19.5 for HP filtered and BK filtered data, respectively. These
estimates are far above the values of T| normally considered realistic.
Estimates by Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988), Friend and
Blume (1975), Neely, Roy, and Whiteman (2001), and many others, indi-
cate realistic estimates of T| are in the range of 0.5-3 (see Mehra and
Prescott 2003, for an extensive discussion). Said differently, for standard
values of the IES, using the observed volatility of consumption, the
model can account for only a small fraction (less than 25 percent) of the
volatility of the vu-ratio.
5







implications. In particular, for realistic second moments of vacancies
and consumption, the labor market matching model implies procyclical
unemployment. To see this, note that condition (28) can be expressed as:









where a variable with a hat Q indicates the logarithm of the variable.The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 25
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Figure 1.2
Actual versus Implied Unemployment
Note: This figure illustrates the actual U.S. unemployment level, with the unemployment
level implied by theorem 1. The diamonds (squares) illustrate the relationship when as-
suming T| = 1(T| = 10). The linear regression lines show that there is a negative relationship
between the actual and predicted unemployment levels.
Suppose the model would be able to reproduce the empirical esti-
mates of the moments of the data that enter on the right hand side of this
expression. In this case, using the estimates in Table 1, the cross-
correlation between unemployment and consumption would equal ap-
proximately 0.99 — r\ 110.
6 Taking a value of r\ in the upper end of the em-
pirically plausible estimates, -n = 3, implies that cor(w, c) — 0.69. In U.S.
data, this correlation is -0.70 (see table 1.1). Therefore, even if the model
could reproduce the correlation between vacancies and consumption
and the variances of consumption, vacancies, and unemployment, it
would require very large and unrealistic values of -n to account for the
countercyclical movements in unemployment observed in the data.
In order to visualize the extent to which the actual and implied un-
employment rates differ, figure 1.2 plots the actual unemployment rate
against the unemployment rate implied by the above relationship for r\
= 1 (a realistic value) and for T| = 10 (an unrealistically high value) on
the basis of HP-filtered U.S. data. In both cases, there is a strong nega-
tive association between the actual and implied unemployment rate.
The intuition for the tendency for procyclical unemployment is
straightforward. In this model, while employment is predetermined,
unemployment is not a state variable, since households can adjust the
number of agents that are actively searching through variations in the26 Ravn
participation rate. An increase in vacancies increases the expected pay-
off from labor market search, since the probability of being matched
with a vacancy rises. Therefore, the participation rate increases, which
leads to a tendency for procyclical unemployment. This effect is moder-
ated only by the extent to which the underlying shock lowers the mar-
ginal utility of consumption (which lowers the payoff from search ac-
tivities). The latter effect, however, is only quantitatively important
when the curvature of the utility function is very large, and we argue
that plausible estimates of the IES imply moderate curvature. Therefore,
fluctuations in vacancies tend to induce equally signed fluctuations in
unemployment through variations in the participation rate. In other
words, the Beveridge curve is—counterfactually—positively sloped
when we allow for a participation choice.
In sum, once one allows agents to choose whether to actively search
or not, the labor market matching model gives rise to a consumption-
tightness puzzle in the sense that unrealistically high degrees of risk
aversion (low degrees of intertemporal elasticity of substitution) are re-
quired to account for (a) the volatility of the z;w-ratio, and (b) the coun-
tercyclical movements in unemployment (and a negatively sloped Bev-
eridge curve).
1.3 Extensions
We now examine a number of extensions of the basic model, in order to
gauge the robustness of the consumption-tightness puzzle highlighted
in the previous section. As we will show, the qualitative features of the
results are robust.
1.3.2 Variable Search Effort
The first extension introduces variable search intensity into the previous
model. We assume that, for given levels of unemployment and vacan-
cies, when more resources are spent on a job search, more matches will
be produced between unemployed workers and firms with vacant jobs.
As in Merz (1995), higher search effort is assumed to give rise to a re-
source cost.
7 Allowing for variable search effort may, therefore, moder-
ate the previous results, since the tendency for households to devote
more resources to search activities when vacancies rise can also be
achieved through variations in the intensive search margin.
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mt = M(vt,htut),
where ht denotes search effort. We assume that the matching technology
displays constant returns to vt, htut, jointly. Thus, the probability that an
actively searching worker finds a job vacancy, mjut = h$(dt/ht), is an in-
creasing function of dt and ht.
We assume that higher search effort (along the intensive margin)
gives rise to a resource cost, d(ht) per search-active household member.
The economy's resource constraint now reads:
yt -




where d is an increasing and convex function.
The first-order necessary conditions for the households' problem (see







This condition states that, in the optimum, marginal search costs
equal the probability that a new match is formed times the marginal
value of a match. Combining this equation with the households first-
order condition for the choice of u implies that:
H(l) - H(l - s) = c" WO - l]d(h), (30)
where v|; is the elasticity of d(h), i\j(h) = [dd(h)/dh][h/d(h)]. Thus, if the
elasticity of the search effort costs is constant, c~^ and d(h) will be per-
fectly negatively correlated. In other words, under these conditions
search effort will be positively correlated with consumption, regardless
of the source of shocks to the economy.
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After some algebra, we can show that when we allow for variable
search efforts at both the intensive and the extensive margins, the fol-
lowing condition must hold:
~ 1 - a "^ iK/z) - 1'
 (31
)
This expression differs from the one derived under the assumption of
constant search effort only by the term \\)(h)/[\\i(h) — 1] that appears on
the left-hand side. When \\}(h) is constant, the model with variable search
effort delivers exactly the same predictions regarding the volatility of28 Ravn
the uu-ratio and the cyclical features of unemployment as the model
with constant search effort.
1.3.2 Homework
Next we consider an extension of the basic model with homework (see,
e.g., Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright 1991).
9 This extension modifies the
trade-off between labor market search and nonparticipation, since
agents now have the opportunity of spending part of their time endow-
ment on home production.
Agents consume two types of goods: market goods (cm) and goods
produced in the home sector (ch). Both goods are produced using inputs
of capital and labor, and are subject to productivity shocks. Goods pro-
duced in the home sector are used for consumption only.
Per capita hours supplied to the home sector are given as:
|x = n\xn + u^u + (1 - n -
where |xn denotes hours worked at home of an employed worker, |xu
hours worked at home of an unemployed household member, and fx,
hours worked at the home of a nonparticipant. The home production re-
source constraint is given as:
ch<g[(l-x)k,v,z
h], (32)
where ch is the consumption of home-goods, and x denotes the fraction
of the aggregate capital stock that is used for production in the market
sector. The variable z
h represents temporary productivity shocks to the
home production technology, which we assume are generated by a first-
order autoregressive process with innovations that are possibly corre-
lated with the innovations to z. We assume that g is increasing and con-
cave in (1 — x)k and in |x, and that it is homogeneous of degree one in [(1
- x)k, JUL] jointly.
The period utility function is given as:
where en — 1 — s — I — \Ln, eu = 1 — s - fil(, and e, = 1 — JUL;; and c is an ag- gregate of the consumption of the two goods:
c = C(cm> ch).
We assume that C is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree
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cm + k' + KV <f{xk, nl, z) + (1 - 8)fc. (33)
The households' problem can now be expressed as choosing se-
quences of consumption, capital stocks, hours worked in the home sec-
tor, the share of active search agents, and the division of capital between
sectors to solve:
J(k, n) = max W~V{1 - t\) + nHw{l - Z - s - MJ + uHu{l ~ s - ji„)
+ (1 - n - u)Hn(l - u,) + £EJ(k', n% (34)
subject to the constraints:
cm + k' < (1 - 5 + rx)k + wnl + TT,
The first-order conditions are described in detail in Appendix B. A key
implication follows from the first-order condition for hours devoted to
homework, which is given as:
dH(xt) _ dC/dch dg
d\Xj dC/dcm d[x
Notice that the right-hand side of this expression does not depend on
the labor market status. Therefore, under the condition that H is strictly
concave, it follows that:
|X, = |JL1( + S = (JL;J + / + S. (35)
In other words, leisure does not depend on labor market status.
Thus, agents that are nonparticipants compensate for their lack of
hours devoted to market activities by working s more hours at home
than agents that are search active, and s + / hours more at home than
agents that are employed. This reflects risk sharing: the marginal disu-
tility of work is equalized across agents (that differ by their labor mar-
ket status).
We follow Gomme, Kydland, and Rupert (2001) and assume that the
consumption aggregator (C) is given by a Cobb-Douglas function:
c
 =
= c^ c^^ £ 6 (0* 1) (36)
and that the home-good production function is given by a Cobb-
Douglas production function:30 Ravn
- x)k, fx, z
h] = z"[(l - x) fc] V"
T, T e (0; 1). (37)
We can now derive the following result:
PROPOSITION 2. In the homework economy with a Cobb-Douglas consumption
aggregator and Cobb-Douglas home production function, the vu-ratio and
consumption of market goods are related as:
c ft
6 = — co,, (38)
|X 1 -ft
PROOF. Using |x, = (JLW + s = \in + I + s, the first-order conditions for the
optimal choices of u, |x(, cm, and ch, and the outcome of the wage bar-
gaining implies that:
dC dg 1 - <& dC
dch dii -& dcm
where equation (35) implies that \x} — \xu = s. Using function (37) we
have:
3|X JJL
and from function (36) it follows that:
dc I dc 1 - £
Inserting these gives equation (38).
This relationship differs from condition (28) in two ways. First, it no
longer involves the risk aversion parameter r\. Second, the relationship
also involves the number of hours supplied to the home sector (|x). The
latter aspect might, potentially, help address the consumption-tightness
puzzle. In particular, a negative covariance between consumption of
market goods and hours supplied to the home sector induces volatility
in the uw-ratio. Most models with home production do imply strongly
countercyclical movements in hours supplied in the home sector
(Gomme, Kydland and Rupert 2001).
Quantitatively, however, even a substantial negative covariance be-
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likely to help explain the gap between the observed volatility of the vu-
ratio and that implied by the growth model with labor market frictions
and a participation choice. The model, therefore, still has a strong ten-
dency for procyclical movements in unemployment and for a positive
contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
To see this, consider the following calculation. The standard deviation of
HP-filtered (per capita) hours worked in the market sector is around
1.75 percent per quarter in the United States (see table 1.1). The volatil-
ity of hours worked in the home sector is unlikely to be higher than this.
Thus, even if consumption of market goods and hours worked in the
home sector were perfectly negatively correlated, the implied standard
deviation of the uw-ratio would be no higher than 2.59 percent (around
ten times lower than the standard deviation of the uw-ratio in the U.S.
data).
1
0 For the same reasons, the model with homework implies a pos-
itive correlation between unemployment and vacancies and procyclical
unemployment.
Therefore we conclude that the introduction of homework does not
impact the consumption-labor market tightness puzzle. On the contrary,
it may even worsen.
1.3.3 Passive Search
The matching technology analyzed so far assumes that nonparticipants
do not receive any job offers. However, in U.S. data there are substantial
flows from out of the labor force directly into employment; see Davis,
Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006) for a recent review. For this reason,
Andolfatto and Gomme (1996), Pries and Rogerson (2004), and Yip
(2003) assume that wage offers might be received by both unemployed
workers and by nonparticipants.
1
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We now extend the model of section 1.2, by allowing for passive
search. We assume that the aggregate matching function is given as:
mt = M
u(vt, ut) + M>(vt, l-nt- ut).
We will assume that m
ujul > m|/(l — nt — ut), in order to be consistent
with the observation that the matching frequency of unemployed work-
ers is much higher than the matching frequency of nonparticipants. This
assumption also compares well with Flinn and Heckman's (1983) find-
ing that unemployment helps facilitate job searches relative to nonpar-
ticipation.32 Ravn
The households' problem is given as:
J(k, n) = max {c
1^/(1 - r\) + nH(l - I - s) + uHQ. ~ s)
(c,k',u,n')
+ (l-n-u)H(l) + £EJ(k',n% (39)
c + k' < (1 - 8 + r)k + wnl + TT, (40)
n' = (1 - a)n + i[u + 7^(1 -n-u), (41)
where equation (41) takes into account that nonparticipants as well as
unemployed household members might become matched. In this equa-
tion we define y\ = m
u/u and ^\ = m
l/(l - n - u).
The firms' problem is unchanged (apart from the change in the prob-
ability that a vacancy is filled). Going through the same steps as in sec-
tion 1.2 gives us the following condition:
u
« + (1 - n)~ a
6—: — = rcocn, (42)
1-n-u 1 - ft
which is identical to condition (28), apart from the ratio
[u + (1 — n)(m
u/m)]/(l — n — u) that appears on the left-hand side. Note
that this ratio is equal to 1 when m
u/m = 1 as we assumed in section 1.2.
When m"/m approaches 0 instead, this ratio becomes equal to w/(l — n
— u). In this case, the left-hand side of condition (42) becomes equal to
the ratio of vacancies to nonparticipation.
According to Fallick and Fleischman (2004), the mean flow from non-
employment into employment is (approximately) equal to 4.6 million in
the United States, and the mean flow from unemployment accounts for
around 1.8 million of these new job findings. Thus, m
u/m is equal to ap-
proximately 40 percent. Assuming that this ratio is constant, we can then
compute the left-hand side of condition (42). Figure 1.3 illustrates the
implied standard deviation of (HP filtered values of) the left-hand side
of condition (42) for alternative values of m
u/m. When m
u/m approaches
zero the implied percentage standard deviation of the left-hand side is
13.2, which is 40 percent lower than the standard deviation of tightness
itself. However, when we set m
u/m equal to its mean U.S. value, the im-
plied standard deviation of the left-hand side of condition (42) is 21.2,
which is only marginally lower than the volatility of tightness. There-
fore, while allowing for passive search helps address the consumption-
tightness puzzle, quantitatively this feature does not appear to matterThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 33
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Figure 1.3
Passive Search Model
Note: The full drawn line illustrates the percentage standard deviation of HP-filtered val-
ues of the left-hand side of equation (42) for alternative values of the share of total matches
due to passive search (M
u/M). The mean value of M"/M in U.S. data is around 40 percent.
The model of section 2 of the paper assumes that M
u/M is equal to 1.
significantly because the left-hand side of condition (42) is insensitive to
m
u/m unless this ratio becomes very small.
Therefore, we conclude that allowing for passive search is not essen-
tial for the results.
1.3.4 Duration-Dependent Matching Functions
The previous section analyzed a setting in which active search agents
and nonparticipants face heterogenous matching functions. An alterna-
tive modeling is that unmatched agents differ in their labor market
prospects, even when actively searching. In particular, recently unem-
ployed agents may face more efficient matching functions than longer-
term unemployed workers or out of the labor force. We now analyze
such a setting.
We assume there are two types of unemployed workers who differ
in their prospects of being matched with vacancies, short-term unem-
ployed, and long-term unemployed. Long-term unemployed workers
face a less efficient matching technology than the short-term unem-
ployed, and this group of agents may choose to become nonparticipants.34 Ravn
As in section 1.2, we assume that only active search agents receive job of-
fers.
The labor market flow dynamics are as follows. Every period, a frac-
tion (CT) of the currently employed worker job matches are terminated,
and a measure (M) of new matches is formed. Workers who experience
a termination of their matches enter into short-term unemployment.
1
2 A
short-term unemployed household member may either remain short-
term unemployed, become matched with a vacancy, or experience a
transition to long-term unemployment. We assume that the latter event
occurs with probability |x e (0; 1). New matches are formed between va-
cant jobs and search active unmatched agents, but the number of
matches depends on both labor market tightness and on the structure of
unemployment.
Formally, we assume that the aggregate number of matches is given as:
M(v, uv u2) = mx{v, ux) + m2(v, u2),
mx(v, u) > m2(v, u) for Vz;, u > 0,
where ux denotes the measure of short-term unemployed workers, and
u2 the measure of long-term unemployed.
The employment transition equation is now given as:
«' = (1 - a)n + mx + mv (43)
and the transition equation for short-term unemployment is given as:
u[ = (1 - <\>)ux + o-n - mx, (44)
where <}> is the probability that a currently short-term unemployed
worker becomes long-term unemployed.
Bellman's equation for the households' problem is:
J(k, n, Ma) = max{c
J-V(l - t]) + nH(l - I - s) + (wa + u2)H(l - s)
(c,k',u)
+ (l-n-Ul- u2)H(l) + $EJ(k', n', ux)), (45)
where we note that short-term unemployment is now a state variable.
The Bellman equation is maximized subject to the constraints:
c + k' < (1 - 8 + r)k + wnl + IT, (46)
n' = (1 - cr)n + ^u, + y
h2u2, (47)
K; = (1 - <!>)«! + an - i[uv (48)The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 35
The variable 7^ denotes the probability that a short-term unemployed
actively search household member is matched with a vacancy, and ^ *
s
the equivalent probability for a long-term unemployed worker.
In this model, the participation choice is relevant for long-term un-
employed household members. Under mild conditions of y* relative to
72/ household members are better off searching as long as they are faced
with the more efficient matching technology.
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of u2 is given by:
WEJn.{k',n') = H(l)-H{l-s). (49)
This condition is equivalent to condition (18), derived in section 1.2,
apart from the definition of the matching market prospect. The marginal
value of employment, however, now takes into account the multiple
matching functions. It is given as:
/„(*, n, Ul) = c-^zvl - [H(l) - H(l - / - s)] + (1 - <T)£EJn.(k', n', u[)
+ <Tfflu.(k',n',u'1).
This determines the marginal value of a job as a sum of the utility
value of the labor income, the expected marginal value of being em-
ployed the next period times the probability that the match survives
(discounted one period), the expected marginal value of short-term un-
employment times the probability that the match is terminated, and less
the utility value of the loss of leisure of working rather than enjoying the
time endowment as leisure. The marginal value of short-term unem-
ployment, in turn, is given as:
Jui(k, n, ux) = •rfpEJ^fc', n', u[) + [(1
- s)].
A short-term unemployed worker finds a job match with probability
7J, which gives him or her the value $EJn,(k', n', u[). With probability [(1
— cf>) — 7^], a currently short-term unemployed worker is still unem-
ployed next period, giving her or him a value of $EJu,(k', n', u[). Finally,
actively searching rather than nonparticipating gives rise to a utility loss
[H(l) — H(l — s)], due to the search effort that must be exerted.
The firms' problem is now:
u'
Q(n) = max{F(k, nl) - wnl - KV - rk + pE— Q(n% (50)
k,v W36 Ravn
subject to:
ri = (1 - &)n + (y{ + y{)v. (51)
Note that we assume firms cannot target any of the two matching
markets individually. The first-order condition for the choice of capital
is identical to the model in section 1.2. The vacancy posting condition,
however, is now:
K = (T{ + y2)PE—(Qn), (52)
where
It is important to notice that the relevant first-order condition for
households' search efforts at the extensive margin involves the proba-
bility that long-term unemployed household members find a job match,
while firms' first-order condition for vacancy postings involve the prob-
ability of meeting any unmatched search active worker. If possible,
firms would prefer target vacancies in the matching market that yield
the highest possible probability of a match with an unemployed worker.
This possibility is, however, ruled out by assumption, and this creates
the wedge between the relevant matching market first-order conditions.
Wages are (again) determined by an ex post Nash bargain. Following




where 0 = v/{ux + u2).
This relationship is similar to the one derived in the previous subsec-
tion, in equation (42), since it implies a modification to the appropriate
measure of tightness. In the current setting, the consumption-tightness
puzzle involves the ratio of vacancies to long-term unemployment
rather than the standard definition of tightness that enters equation (28).
If u2 is literally interpreted as long-term unemployment, this model
leads to an even bigger consumption-tightness puzzle than the model
we analyzed in section 1.2. The reason is that longer-term unemploy-
ment is even more volatile than overall unemployment. In table 1.1 we
report, for example, the moments of vacancies to unemployment above
fifteen weeks of duration. The standard deviation of this ratio is aroundThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 37
35 percent per quarter, which is 59 percent higher than the standard de-
viation of tightness itself.
However, this calculation might be misleading, for two reasons. First,
u2 does not directly measure long-term unemployment, although the
unemployment duration of agents faced with the inefficient matching
technology will (on average) be longer than the mean duration of agents
faced with the more efficient matching technology. Second, the mea-
surement of the duration of unemployment (applied by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics) defines the duration of unemployment as the length of
"in-progress spell of joblessness." The duration of unemployment of an
active search agent faced with the inefficient matching technology, who
was previously out of the labor force, will (therefore) be measured by
the duration of the current job search (rather than the length of time
since the last job match).
For these reasons, the measurement of u2 on the basis of long-term un-
employment might be misleading. In essence, u2 denotes the measure of
agents who, despite being faced with a potentially inefficient matching
technology, still find it worthwhile to be actively searching. It is not clear
how to match this measure up with the data, and we (therefore) leave it
open whether duration dependence of the matching market prospects is
important for accounting for the consumption-tightness puzzle.
1.4 Discussion
The previous analysis has illustrated the robust relationship between
the marginal utility of consumption and labor market tightness that we
derived in section 1.2. We now discuss some wider aspects of the result,
and its implications.
The low volatility of labor market tightness and procyclical move-
ments in unemployment derive from the variations in labor market par-
ticipation. In the set up that we study, households optimally choose to
increase labor market participation in response to increases in labor
market tightness. It is this mechanism that implies low volatility of labor
market tightness in equilibrium.
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Hence, it is clear that variations in the participation rate are key, and
the introduction of an extensive search margin leads to a strong ten-
dency for procyclical variations in labor market participation. Figure 1.4
illustrates the U.S. labor market participation rate from 1947 onward.
The figure clearly illustrates the secular increase in the U.S. participation




Note: The graph illustrates the civilian noninstitutional labor force, as a share of the civil-
ian noninstitutional population of age 16 and above. The shaded areas are recessions as
defined by the NBER dating committee.
percent by the 2000s, an increase that is dominated by the increase in the
employment rate (from 56 percent to 64 percent).
Figure 1.4 also illustrates (shaded areas) the recessions of the U.S.
economy, according to the NBER business-cycle dating committee. The
figure indicates that the secular increase in the participation rate pre-
dominantly took place during periods of high activity. In particular, the
secular increase in the participation rate either slowed down or was re-
versed during each of the recessions. Thus, consistent with the theory,
there appears to be some cyclical features of the movement in the par-
ticipation rate.
To examine this further, the last rows of the two panels of table 1.1 re-
port the moments of HP filtered and BK filtered participation rates. The
participation rate is procyclical, but displays low volatility at the busi-
ness cycle frequencies, regardless of the detrending method. In particu-
lar, relative to trend, the standard deviation of the participation rate is
around one fourth of the standard deviation of consumption at the busi-
ness cycle frequencies, and the cross-correlation between these variables
is just below 30 percent.
Figure 1.5 illustrates (in the top panel) the HP filtered U.S. data for
consumption and the participation rate. This clearly illustrates that the
participation rate is much smoother than consumption at the business
cycle frequencies. The figure also hints that there might be a phase shiftThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 39
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between consumption and participation rates. In particular, with the ex-
ception of the late 1970s, the participation rate appears to lag behind
the fluctuations in consumption. The lower panel illustrates the cross-
correlation function between consumption and leads and lags of the
participation rate. The results indicate that the participation rate lags
about four quarters later than consumption. Moreover, with a four-
quarter lag, the cross-correlation is as high as 65 percent.
Nevertheless, despite this high correlation, the elasticity of the partic-
ipation rate compared to consumption is still estimated low. Using the40 Ravn
-80 -i
1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Date
- wy-ratio • Participation rate
Figure 1.6
Labor Market Tightness and Participation Rate
Note: The top panel illustrates percentage deviations from an HP-trend of the uw-ratio (left
scale), and of labor market participation (right scale).
estimates from table 1.1, the elasticity of the participation rate (with re-
spect to consumption) is around 17 percent (with a four-quarter lag).
Thus, even large cyclical fluctuations in consumption are associated
with small variations in participation rates.
Similarly, figure 1.6 illustrates the relationship between the uw-ratio
and labor market participation rates. The top panel shows the devia-
tions from (Hodrick-Prescott) trends of the uu-ratio and of the partici-
pation rate. Given the large difference in their volatility, the pw-ratioThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 41
is plotted against the left axis and the participation rate against the
right axis. Consistent with the model we have analyzed, these two vari-
ables are clearly positively related. The lower panel shows the cross-
correlation function in leads and lags. As above, there is a substantial
positive correlation, and it occurs with a lag (but slightly shorter than
above). With a two-quarter lag (of the participation rate), the cross-
correlation is close to 70 percent.
This suggests that perhaps the findings of this paper are related to
costs of entering and exiting the labor force. Such costs might explain
why the participation rate moves so little (in response to variations in
the benefits of job search), and why the participation rate appears to lag
behind output and consumption over the business cycle. Such costs also
appear realistic for some parts of the agents who compose the out of the
labor force group. Young people who are still in school, or workers who
have to move in order to search for a job (for example) might find it
costly to change their labor market status. On the other hand, using a
limited information approach, Ravn (2005) estimates such costs to be
very large in order to account for the labor market movements over the
business cycle, which casts doubt on this aspect being the sole explana-
tion for the findings of this paper.
An alternative assumption, adopted by Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005)
and Haefke and Reiter (2006), is that agents differ in their evaluation of
leisure (or in their productivity in homework). This implies that the non-
participants will be heterogenous with respect to how close their as-
sessment of nonparticipation is to their assessment of labor market
search. In particular, those agents that value leisure highly may find it
optimal to remain out of the labor force, even for large increases in the
value of searching. Through this mechanism, heterogeneity in the valu-
ation of leisure (or in home productivity) can limit the tendency for pro-
cyclical movements in labor force participation that have been derived
in this paper. However, this setup appears to be in contradiction to the
large observed flows of agents from nonparticipation into employment
(and into unemployment), which we discussed in section 1.3.3, unless
there are large idiosyncratic shocks to preferences or home productivity.
We find such idiosyncratic preferences shocks hard to interpret.
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Therefore, we find it more promising to explore (in more detail) the
type of settings we studied in sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4. Here, duration de-
pendence and passive search jointly imply that: (a) there is less incentive
to join the labor force in response to increases in the value of search, and42 Ravn
(b) some of the nonparticipants might find it unprofitable to actively
search for a job (not because they value leisure highly, but because they
face little prospect of finding a job through active search).
1.5 Summary and Conclusions
An important line of research in business cycle theory has studied the ef-
fects of matching frictions in the labor market. This is an important de-
velopment in business cycle theory, since fluctuations in labor are key
for understanding the business cycle (Kydland 1995). The matching fric-
tions assumed in the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) setup, places the
labor market in a central role of the propagation of shocks over time and
across agents.
This chapter has analyzed the effects of introducing a labor market
participation choice, and, surprisingly, has shown that the introduction
of a labor market participation choice is of considerable analytical con-
venience, since it allows us to derive a very simple testable relationship
between labor market tightness and consumption. Moreover, this rela-
tionship is robust in the various extensions of the baseline model that we
proposed. The advantage of this result is that it involves only observable
variables, which gives rise to a relationship that does not depend on the
properties of the stochastic processes of exogenous variables.
A standard perception from such labor market matching models is
that unemployment, consistent with the data, behaves countercyclically
as job matches increase in good times when firms increase their invest-
ment in job hiring activities. This paper has shown, however, that once
one introduces an endogenous labor market participation choice, there
is a strong tendency for procyclical behavior of unemployment. The
reason is that labor market nonparticipants have an incentive to enter
the labor market, that is, begin an active search, when labor market
prospects improve. These procyclical movements in labor market par-
ticipation rates imply low volatility of the ratio of vacancies to unem-
ployment, and a positive slope of the Beveridge curve. Evidently, in U.S.
data, although participation rates do move procyclically, the elasticity of
the participation rate is very low.
Understanding why this is the case is an important issue for further
research. There are various avenues open to address this. One possibil-
ity is to introduce costs of entering and exiting the labor force. Another
possibility is to introduce some of the aspects that we examine in section
1.3. It is possible when these features are joined, and possibly combinedThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 43
with other extensions (such as habit persistence, nonseparable prefer-
ences, incomplete markets), that this will yield a solution to the con-
sumption-tightness puzzle. We will examine this in future research.
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Notes
1. Bowlus (1997) makes the same assumption in a search model as Haefke and Reiter
(2006) also do.
2. We simplify the notation slightly for presentational purposes. The state variables of the
households also include the aggregate capital stock, aggregate employment, and the sto-
chastic variables z and <r.
3. As is standard in the business cycle literature, we use a value of 1,600 for the smooth-
ing parameter in the HP filter. For the BK filter we use a moving average length of twelve
quarters, and the cut-off frequencies are chosen as six quarters and thirty-two quarters (re-
spectively).
4. Table Al reports the definitions and sources of the data.
5. The model can easily be extended to include productivity growth. In this case condition
(28) is still valid but relates the uw-ratio to consumption, relative to the level of productiv-
ity. Therefore, one may wonder whether the calculations should not relate the level of the
yw-ratio to detrended consumption. Following this strategy, however, implies even higher
and more unrealistic estimates of r\. Using Baxter and King's (1999) filtered consumption,
for example, the slope of the regression lines implies a value of T\ of twenty, and the ratio
of standard deviations of the ww-ratio and consumption gives a value of forty for TQ.
6. To get this expression, express cor (u, c) as [var (u)/var (w)]
1/
2 cor [(£, v)] - 7][var(c)/var
(w)].
1/
2 Inserting the estimates, on the basis of the HP-filtered data in table 1.1 implies the
formula in the text.
7. Search effort, therefore, has the interpretation of costs of, for example, filling in job ap-
plications, travelling to job interviews, and so on. Alternatively, one can assume search ef-
forts give rise to leisure costs (Andolfatto 1996). However, the latter modeling implies that
search effort is constant in the optimum (see note 8) and is less interesting for our purposes.
8. Merz (1995) also finds procyclical search intensity in a standard labor market matching
model without the participation choice. Her result is derived from the impulse responses
in a numerically solved version of the model. For the Andolfatto (1996) specification of
leisure costs of search effort, we would assume d(h) = 0 and that xu - (1 - h - s). This im-
plies, however, that optimal search effort is constant, since the first-order condition for h
can be expressed as: —3H(1 — h — s)/dh = [H(l) — H(l — h — s)]/h, which involves only h
and constants. Therefore the optimal h is constant.44 Ravn
9. Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) also introduce homework into a matching framework
with a participation choice. Cooley and Quadrini (1999) include homework in a matching
framework with limited-asset market participation.
10. To get this number, assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, it follows from
equation (38) that the standard deviation of the logarithm of the vu-ratio is given as [of +
of — 2cov(c, r)]
in. Assuming that cov(c, r) = — (rc<jr, and using the values for CTC and ur from
table 1.1 for the HP filter data gives the number in the text.
11. In principle, time aggregation might account for the recorded flows from out of the la-
bor force to employment, even if nonparticipants have to become active searchers to find
a job match.
12. Strictly speaking, the use of the terms short-term unemployment and long-term unem-
ployment is misleading, since the transition from the former to the latter group occurs in-
dependently of the duration of unemployment. However, on average, the former group
will have experienced shorter unemployment spells than the latter.
13. Notice, however, that the response of unemployment to vacancies may lead to high
volatility of vacancies itself.
14. A similar mechanism can be introduced into the setup studied in this chapter by al-
lowing for shocks to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
Denoting such a taste shock for £(, the equivalent of condition (28) becomes 0 =
[fr/(l - ft)] to^c
11. A large variance of the taste shock may, therefore, break the link between
consumption and tightness.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the Results for the Model with Variable Search Effort
In this model, the households problem is given as:
J(k, n) = max [c^/{l - t\) + nH(l - I - s) + uH(l ~ s)
+ (l-n-u)H(l) + $EJ(k',n')],
subject to:
c + k' < (1 - 8 + r)k + wnl + ir - ud(h),The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 47
ri = (1 - a)n + -y
huh.
We let \c denote the multiplier on the first constraint, and kn the mul-
tiplier on the second constraint. The first-order conditions are given by:
c • cv = K
k:Jk{k,n) = Xc(l-b + r)
u : H(l) - H(l - s) = y\h -
n : Jn(k, n) = kcwl + (1 - o-)\n + H(l — I — s) —
Combining the first-order conditions for h and n' gives us:
c-,m = M,EJAKn%
which is equation (29) in the text.
Next, combining the conditions for u, c, and h implies:
- s) = y\nfe
- s) = c"V(liMli) - 1],
which is equation (30) in the text. The firms' problem is unchanged rel-
ative to the basic model. The Nash wage bargaining, therefore, implies:
where:
UK n) = \wl + H(l - / - s) -
Qn(n) = Fn - wl + (1 - [Qn{)l
Uc
and from the envelope conditions, we have:48 Ravn
From the first-order condition for h we have, we can express the latter
as:
() - H{\ - s)
nW, n') = — J
Therefore, it follows that:
- s)
which can be rearranged to give us:
- s)]
which corresponds to equation (31).
Appendix B
Homework
The firms' problem is again unchanged so we concentrate on the house-
holds' problem. It can be formulated as:
J(k, n) = max [c^Vl - r\) + nH(l - I - s - \xw) + uH(l-s- |xj
(c,n'Xu,r,x)
+ (1 - n - u)H(l - JJLJ + pE/(Jt',«')].
subject to:
cm + k' < (1 - 8 + rx)k + wnl + IT,
n' ~ (1 - cr)n + y
hu,
- x)k, nix,, + MIX,. + (1 — n —
We denote the multipliers on these restrictions (in that order) by \v X2




acThe Consumption-Tightness Puzzle 49
u : \27* + K^riVu ~ M.) = H(l - |x,) - H(l - s -
M,fl:«H'(l-/-s-M,fl) = \3|^n
dfx
iiu:uH'(l-s-iiu) = \3^-u d(x
JJL, : (1 - n - u)H'{\ - ii,) = \3-^(l - n - u)
x : X/fc = X3-^fc
K
n :/„ = H(l - / - s - IJLJ - H(l - JJL,) + X^/ + X2(l - a)
The first-order conditions for jxw, |xu and |JL; immediately imply that:
^z
 = ^u +
 s = Vn + I +
 s/
since:
H'(l - / - s - JJLB) = H'(l - s - jxj - H'(l - p.,)-
Turn now to the wage bargaining. We have:
where:
UK n) = \wl + K~(K
d|x50 Ravn
and the envelope conditions imply:
dg
Therefore, we get:
dc a? i-d ac
We now use the Cobb-Douglas assumptions, and the result from
above, that rx — ru = s, which allows us to express this condition as:
C ch 1 - fl C
(1 - 0-s(l - T)-^ = -—— K — BZ,
ch \x ft cm
which can be re arranged to give us equation (38):
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Table 1A.1















Civilian noninstitutional population 16 years of age and
above
Gross Domestic Product in chained year 2000 prices divided
by civilian noninstitutional population
Personal Consumption Expenditure in chained year 2000,
prices divided by civilian noninstitutional population
Nonfarm hours divided by civilian noninstitutional
population
Total unemployment divided by civilian noninstitutional
population
Index of help wanted advertising in newspapers divided by
civilian noninstitutional population
Vacancies divided by unemployment
Civilians unemployed 15 weeks and above divided by
civilian noninstitutional population
Sum of civilian employment and unemployment divided
by civilian noninstitutional population
Source
Economagic,
Fed. of St. Louis
Economagic,
Fed. of St. Louis
Economagic,
Fed. of St. Louis
DRI database
Economagic,
Fed. of St. Louis
Economagic,
Fed. of St. Louis
—
Economagic,
Fed. of St. Louis
Economagic,
Fed. of St. LouisComment
Kai Christoffel, European Central Bank
The previous chapter introduces an endogenous labor market partici-
pation choice into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model,
embedded into a stochastic growth model. It provides a very clear and
instructive analysis of an important margin in the labor market. While
several papers stress the importance of endogenous labor market par-
ticipation for long-run economic performance, the business cycle appli-
cations of endogenous participation have been less successful. This pa-
per contributes to bridging the gap between labor market participation
in the medium and long run, and understanding the business cycle fre-
quency fluctuations of participation. In the chapter, it is shown that the
introduction of the participation margin, into the labor market model,
allows for an analytical expression of labor market tightness (vacancies
divided by unemployed) as a linear function of (the marginal utility of)
consumption. The consumption-tightness puzzle is formulated by
showing that, under plausible parameterizations, the model can only ac-
count for a small fraction of the observed volatility of labor market tight-
ness. The introduction of the participation margin has a direct effect on
the market tightness condition, and (therefore) on the general dynamics
of the model. However, these modifications have some counterfactual
implications. The unemployment rate is procyclical, and the model fails
to reproduce a (negatively sloped) Beveridge curve. The author ac-
knowledges these shortcomings, and provides some modifications of
the basic model. Though these modifications are not sufficient to over-
come the dynamic inconsistencies, they offer some further insight into
the dynamics of labor market flows.
I will divide my comments into three parts. First, I will give a brief
summary on the main contribution of the paper. I will then highlight the
dynamic inconsistencies of the model. Third, I will discuss modifica-
tions of the model and their implications on the main inconsistencies.Comment 53
Summary
The introduction of the endogenous labor participation decision has
several implications on the dynamic properties of the model. As in the
standard Mortensen-Pissarides matching model the firms post vacan-
cies until the cost (K), associated with the posting of an additional va-
cancy equals the expected discounted revenue from a filled vacancy
(weighted by the matching probability).
where Q(n) gives the value of a firm with n filled jobs, and y
f gives the
probability a vacancy of a firm is filled.
The introduction of endogenous participation allows us to write the
labor market participation decision in an equivalent form. Due to the
endogenous participation choice, the household includes the unem-
ployment rate as a control variable in the optimization problem. The as-
sociated first-order conditions for unemployment and next period em-
ployment are:
H(l) - H(l - s) = 7 V (2)
and
K = VEJn.(k',n'). (3)
where f(n,k) is the value function of the household (contingent on the
capital holdings) and the number of employed household members,
and kn denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the evolution of employment.
Combining first-order conditions (2) and (3), we arrive at the follow-
ing:
H(l) - H(l - s)
: = REUk',n'). (4)
1
This condition states that nonparticipating household members will
enter the labor market until the utility loss from labor market participa-
tion equals the expected additional value from labor market participa-
tion. This expected value is given by the marginal increase in the value
function, due to an additional employed household member weighted
by the probability that a searching worker is matched to a firm.
It is important to note the symmetry of conditions (1) and (4). In both
expressions, the derivative of the respective value function is directly re-54 Christoffel
lated to model variables. To relate the first-order conditions of house-
holds and firms, we can write the standard surplus sharing rule (in ex-
pectations) resulting from the wage bargaining as follows:
Qn,(n')- (5)
Plugging conditions (1) and (4), into equation (5) we get an equation
for market tightness:
- wn - s)
— c\ (6) 7^ 1 — ft K
Labor market tightness is written as a linear function of the marginal
utility of consumption. Under plausible parameterizations the model
can only explain a small fraction of the observed fluctuations in 0.
Dynamic Implications
To get a better understanding of the labor market dynamic, it is instruc-
tive to analyze the flows into and out of unemployment. The first flow
into unemployment occurs due to the exogenous separation of existing
work relations at rate or. Vacancy posting, and labor market participation
decisions imply two further flows which are closely related. If the prof-
its of the firm ir
f = F(k,nl) — wnl — KV — rk increase, firms will react by
posting additional vacancies according to condition (1). In addition to
the usual employment effects of vacancy posting, the increased number
of vacancies in the market is also inducing nonparticipating workers to
enter the labor market. Using equation (4) we can decompose the par-
ticipation decision into two effects. First, the increase in profits implies
a higher joint surplus of employment relations, increased wages, and an
increase in the value function of the households. Second, the increased
vacancy posting implies a higher probability that a searching worker
will be matched to a firm. Under endogenous participation, these effects
drive up labor market participation. The participation decisions have an
immediate effect on unemployment, while the creation of new matches
is costly and time consuming such that unemployment increases after a
positive shock to the profits of firms. These effects imply a positive cor-
relation of consumption and unemployment. The very same effect is
also causal for the positive correlation between vacancies and unem-
ployment, implying a positive slope in the Beveridge curve. It is impor-
tant to note that this effect is generated by the endogenous labor marketComment 55
participation decision but does not exist in the standard Mortensen-
Pissarides model.
Furthermore, the endogenous participation choice is also affecting the
vacancy posting intensity and could contribute to the vacancy fluctua-
tion discussion initiated by Shimer (2005). Under constant participation,
additional posted vacancies increase market tightness and decrease the
probability that a vacancy is matched. This congestion externality limits
the fluctuations in vacancies. Under endogenous participation the con-
gestion externality is much less severe. Additional vacancies trigger
the market entry of nonparticipating households, such that market
tightness reacts to a lesser extend. The decreased congestion externality
(due to the participation margin) could provide a channel to explain
observed vacancy and employment fluctuations in the Mortensen-
Pissarides model.
In order to relate these channels to the data, Ravn relies on the market
tightness condition (6). While the theoretical model implies a largely
proportionate volatility of consumption and labor market tightness, the
data shows that labor market tightness is around twenty times as
volatile as consumption. As discussed above, the reason for this effect is
the strong and procyclical response of participation and unemploy-
ment. As a corollary of this relationship, the downward sloping Bev-
eridge curve relation in the data cannot be reproduced by the model. In
the data vacancies and unemployment are negatively correlated, indi-
cating that in periods of increased economic activity firms post more va-
cancies and unemployment goes down.
We find that the main reason for these dynamic inconsistencies can be
found in the strong reaction of participation and its implications on un-
employment.
Extensions
Section 3 in the chapter offers several extensions to the basic model, in
order to overcome the dynamic inconsistencies.
Section 1.3.3 introduces passive search into the model. This implies
that nonparticipating household members face a certain probability to
become employed, even though they do not enter the formal search
market. This approach seems to be promising from an empirical point of
view. As cited in the chapter, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) find that
only 40 percent of the flow into employment is actually coming from un-
employment. Considering this evidence calls for a modeling of signifi-56 Christoffel
cant flows, from inactivity directly into employment. To model these
flows a second matching function is introduced. The number of matches
in the second matching function is determined by the number of posted
vacancies, and by the number of nonparticipating households (1 — n —
u). This specification has some implications in the Mortensen-Pissarides
modeling approach. A lot of research focuses on the failure of the model
to produce an appropriate degree of vacancy and employment fluctua-
tion. Under passive search and endogenous participation it is possible
to explain further employment fluctuations without having to rely
solely on the degree of vacancy fluctuations.
In the chapter it is assumed that the ratio of matches (mut/mt) is con-
stant. Under this assumption, the dynamics of the model are not
strongly affected by the introduction of passive search. Equation (7)









Only if the ratio of matches from unemployment to total matches is
small will the dynamics of the model be significantly affected by the
fraction on the left side of equation (7). To check the validity of this re-
sult, it could be useful to relax the assumption of a constant ratio of
matches from unemployment to total matches. Using the matching
functions mut = (puvfu]~^, and mlt = ip}vf(l — nt — uty~^ with cpz < cpw we can write the ratio of matches in equation (7) as:
ip, / 1 — n, — u. \i-^l-i
+ - ' -) • (8)
Plugging this expression into equation (7) shows that the labor mar-
ket tightness condition is no longer exclusively related to consumption,
but is also determined by the dynamics of the ratio of unemployment to
that of the nonparticipating labor force.
This extension introduces the important flow from inactivity directly
into employment. After a positive shock to firm profits, vacancy post-
ing increases. This increases the matching probability for both the par-
ticipating and the nonparticipating household members. The higher
efficiency of the matching function, for the participating household
members, gives incentives to enter the labor market. The flow from
nonparticipation into unemployment implies that the unemployment
rate will remain procyclical.Comment 57
Further extensions aim to curb the response of participation. An ex-
tension proposed in the paper assumes that the efficiency of the match-
ing functions depends on being short-term or long-term unemployed,
where the movements in and out of participation are restricted to the
second group. An alternative method to dampen the participation deci-
sion is proposed by Haefke and Reiter (2006), who build on Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2005). They construct a home production model, where
they model a cross-sectional density of productivity in the home sector.
The main implication of this modification is that changes in the labor
market conditions will affect only the household members close to the
participation margin. They claim that, once the cross-sectional density is
calibrated properly, the labor market participation reaction is attenu-
ated, and the counterfactual implications of the model disappear.
Conclusion
The chapter introduces an endogenous labor market participation choice
into a standard Mortensen-Pissarides business cycle matching model. In
view of the important role of labor market participation, for medium-
and long-run supply side dynamics as well as for business cycle fluctua-
tions, it is important to model the associated labor market flow in a busi-
ness cycle model. The analytical tractability allows for an instructive and
intuitive analysis of endogenous participation. The counterfactual dy-
namic properties of this class of model are, however, persisting. In the
data, labor market participation displays mildly procyclical fluctuations
and is lagging the cycle by several quarters. In the model the reaction of
labor market participation is immediate, and too strong.
To consolidate the model dynamics with the data, it is necessary to
curb the model response of labor market participation. The chapter pro-
poses several ways to achieve this aim, including passive search and
heterogenous search functions. An important and interesting extension
of the model could include further modifications along the mentioned
developments to enhance the model properties. Furthermore, it could
be interesting to model home production under heterogenous produc-
tivity levels, to allow for a flexible modeling of the participation margin.
Notes
1. In the following exposition I am reintroducing the time indices to distinguish between
variables and parameters.58 Christoffel
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This chapter provides a valuable addition to the search and matching lit-
erature by considering a model where people choose whether to be out
of the labor force, or unemployed. While not the first model of endoge-
nous labor participation, its features are somewhat different from those
considered previously. Interestingly, the model proves to have spectacu-
larly counterfactual predictions: the ratio of unemployment to vacancies
is predicted to fluctuate very little, and unemployment is predicted to be
larger in booms than in recessions. This shows that the model's mecha-
nism to induce changes in endogenous participation is unattractive.
My discussion concentrates on two points. This first is that the sim-
plest way to avoid the counterfactual implications of the model is to al-
low for variations in the marginal cost of job search, that is the cost of the
job search for the last person that shifts from being out of the labor force
to being unemployed. Put differently, the model's difficulties seem due
(at least in part) to the supposition that the cost of being unemployed,
rather than being out of the labor force, is constant and the same for
everyone. What this implies is that small changes in the benefit from
working lead everyone to prefer to join the labor force—so that the vari-
ations in labor force participation are much larger than those observed
in reality. This implication can be avoided by following Haefke and Re-
iter (2006), so that people differ in the extent to which they value search-
ing for a job (through unemployment) as opposed to being out of the la-
bor force. At any given moment there are then people who are
indifferent between the unemployed (U), and the out of the labor force
(N) state. However, small increases in the benefits from being in the em-
ployed (E) state do not, in this case, lead to a massive desire to switch
from N to U.
The second point is that the behavior of the six flows between the
three states E, N, and U, as reported in Blanchard and Diamond (1990),60 Rotemberg
seems at odds with the model in important respects. First, these flows re-
flect substantial heterogeneity that is not present in the model. In any
given month, for example, one finds both people giving up on searching
(that is moving from U to N), and people joining the labor force (that is
going from N to U). More importantly, it is not clear that the model cap-
tures the underlying flows that stand behind the observed reductions in
labor force participation that one observes in recessions.
Consider an abbreviated version of Ravn's basic model. The house-
holds utility at t depends on two stocks, namely the capital stock kt and
employment nt. If household member i is unemployed, his disutility
from unemployment equals z". The disutility of working, instead, is
equal to z




where (3, r\, and z
w are parameters, Et takes expectations based on infor-
mation at t, and c is each member's consumption.
As is standard, the matching technology makes the probability that an
unemployed worker finds a job (7*) be equal to <$>(vt/ut), where i;f is the
vacancy rate. With a separation rate of at, the dynamics for employment
satisfy:
nt+l = (1 - <rt)nt + i
htut. (1)
The novelty of letting participation be endogenous, is that the house-
hold realizes it can increase expected employment by 7^ by letting one
more member be unemployed. For the household to be indifferent, with





This states that the marginal benefit of employment to the household is
equal to its expected marginal cost, which is that more members will
have to be unemployed.
Now consider matters from the perspective of firms. Their present
discounted value of profits also depends on employment, and can be
written as Q(nt). Firms have the option of posting vacancies, and each of
these has a cost K. Posting an additional vacancy at t leads to a probabil-
ity 7{ of having an additional employee at t + 1, where equation (1) im-
plies that 7{ut = y
ht ur We expect that (in equilibrium) firms should beComment 61




1 is the rate at which firms discount the future.
Nash bargaining (between the firm and the household) implies that
the benefits to the firm of hiring an additional employee must be pro-
portional to the benefits to a household of having an additional worker
employed. Supposing that K is denominated in consumption units, the
change in Q from extra employment at t + 1 is c~^\dQ/dnt+1, in units of
utility, so that Nash bargaining requires:






where £ is a constant. Combining this with conditions (2) and (3) yields:
Z" K






v/here | is a constant.
Equation (4) captures the implication that, under Ravn's assumption
that z" is constant, the v/u ratio cannot move more than consumption in
the case of the log utility. The intuition for this result is straightforward.
Nash bargaining implies that the benefits to the firm of an additional
employee must be proportional to the benefits of employment of an ad-
ditional member of the household. This, in turn, implies that the cost of
employment to a firm (via increasing vacancies) must be proportional to
the cost of employment to households (via increasing the number of
members looking for work). Because the cost of vacancies is denomi-
nated in consumption units, and the cost of unemployment is denoted
in units of utility, the ratio of costs of employment to the household (rel-
ative to the costs of employment to firms) is allowed to depend on the
marginal utility of consumption. The only other determinant of the ra-
tio of the cost of employment for a household, relative to the cost of em-
ployment for a firm, is the ratio of v to u, with a high v/u implying that
obtaining an additional employee is relatively more costly for a house-62 Rotemberg
hold. Thus, the ratio u/v cannot vary more than the marginal utility of
consumption.
The easiest way out of this straightjacket is to suppose that z" varies
over time. The v/u ratio can then vary in proportion to 1/z". If the cost
of converting a household member into a searcher is high, the unem-
ployment rate can be low relative to the vacancy rate. The intuition for
this is straightforward as well. Even if workers find it easy to find jobs
because the unemployment rate is low, households will not send addi-
tional members to search if their cost of search is high.
Along the lines of Haefke and Reiter (2006), one can interpret this vari-
ation in z" as being related to heterogeneity of household members.
When the unemployment rate is high, the marginal household member
that is being sent to look for work has a low search cost. In the Haefke
and Reiter (2006) model, this member has low productivity in house-
hold production. Not surprisingly, that model can explain why unem-
ployment would rise in recessions (when the surplus of low search cost
workers in the household leads many of them to search), where the
Ravn model implies that unemployment should rise in booms.
In a sense, the Ravn model represents too much of a departure from
the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model. One can interpret the MP model
as one with endogenous labor force participation, with z" being so low
that every member of the household searches when they are not em-
ployed (so that the optimum is not interior). Haefke and Reiter (2006) al-
low some household members to have a low z", though the distribution
of these costs ensures that some members are indifferent to searching
and being out of the labor force. Ravn is going much further because he
supposes that no member strictly prefers to search since they all have a
high enough z" to be indifferent between searching and being out of the
labor force.
Now turn to the broader issues concerning the connection between
this model of endogenous labor force participation, and the observa-
tions regarding flows in Blanchard and Diamond (1990). An attractive
aspect of the Ravn model is that it is consistent with procyclical labor
force participation. The defect, of course, is that this happens because
fewer people are unemployed in recessions. Blanchard and Diamond
(1990,121) report on what happens to all six flows between E, N, and U
as aggregate activity slows down. As might be expected from the fact
that the separation rate moves little in Shimer (2005), there is only a
small increase in the E to U flow (and this is offset somewhat by a re-
duction in the E to N flow). Similarly, the procyclical finding rate meansComment 63
that recessions are associated with reductions in the flows from U to E,
and from N to E. Unlike the present model, the reduction in the flow
from N to E appears to account for the reduction in the participation
rate. The reason is that the flow from N to U actually increases, while the
flow from U to N actually falls. In other words, unlike what the model
predicts, recessions are not periods where people who would otherwise
be unemployed move out of the labor force (or become discouraged).
The question of what accounts for the increased attraction of the U
state in recessions, both for people who are initially unemployed (and
fail to move to N) and for people who are initially out of the labor force,
is a fascinating one. One possible hypothesis is that these movements
are related to the absence of insurance markets, and to the existence of
credit constraints. As Chetty (2006) has demonstrated, lack of liquidity
plays a big role in the behavior of the unemployed by making them
more likely to find a job. What might account for the behavior of job
flows is that losing a job in a recession is more likely to land people in fi-
nancial difficulty because the job finding rate is lower. The unemployed
are, thus, less willing to pause their job search by joining the N state.
Similarly, spouses of people who lose their jobs in recessions might go
from the N to the U state, in order to try to avoid the financial problems
that the family would encounter if both the original employee and the
spouse stayed without employment for long.
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